

Times of Security

“This edited book is central to the main currents of anthropological work on politics, and to the understanding of discourses of security. It addresses these bodies of literature, uniquely and creatively in the opinion of this reader, through a consideration of anthropological work on time and temporality—another lively and current key theme of much recent anthropology. *Times of Security* offers compelling ethnographies of security from a range of different geographical contexts, from South America to Europe and the Middle East, and at different scales, ranging from considerations of local contexts to nation states and even the planet in its entirety.”

—Magnus Marsden, SOAS, University of London

In the current world disorder, security is on everyone’s lips. But what is security from a cross-cultural perspective? How is it imagined and experienced by people on the ground? Crucially, what visions of the future are at stake in people’s potentially divergent concerns with security: what, and when, is the time of security? Exploring diverse notions and experiences of time involved in security practices across the globe, this volume brings together a selection of international scholars who conduct ethnographic research in a broad ambit of securitized contexts – from the experience of Palestinian detainees in Israel or forms of popular violence in Bolivia, to efforts to normalize social relations in post-conflict Yugoslavia and ways of imagining threat in left-radical protest movements in Northern Europe. Interrogating recent debates about the role of “securitization” in contemporary politics, the book paves the way for novel forms of security analysis at the crossroads between anthropology and political science, focusing on the comparative study of the temporalities of securitization in a multi-polar world. Offering a pioneering synthesis, the book will be of interest not only to anthropologists, but also to students and scholars in political science and the growing field of Security Studies in International Relations.

Martin Holbraad teaches at the Anthropology Department of University College London, where he co-runs the Cosmology, Religion, Ontology and Culture Research Group (CROC).

Morten Axel Pedersen is Professor of Social Anthropology at the University of Copenhagen.

Routledge Studies in Anthropology

- 1 Student Mobility and Narrative in Europe**
The New Strangers
Elizabeth Murphy-Lejeune
- 2 The Question of the Gift**
Essays across Disciplines
Edited by Mark Osteen
- 3 Decolonising Indigenous Rights**
Edited by Adolfo de Oliveira
- 4 Traveling Spirits**
Migrants, Markets and Mobilities
Edited by Gertrud Hüwelmeier and Kristine Krause
- 5 Anthropologists, Indigenous Scholars and the Research Endeavour**
Seeking Bridges Towards Mutual Respect
Edited by Joy Hendry and Laara Fitznor
- 6 Confronting Capital**
Critique and Engagement in Anthropology
Edited by Pauline Gardiner Barber, Belinda Leach and Winnie Lem
- 7 Adolescent Identity**
Evolutionary, Cultural and Developmental Perspectives
Edited by Bonnie L. Hewlett
- 8 The Social Life of Climate Change Models**
Anticipating Nature
Edited by Kirsten Hastrup and Martin Skrydstrup
- 9 Islam, Development, and Urban Women's Reproductive Practices**
Cortney Hughes Rinker
- 10 Senses and Citizenships**
Embodying Political Life
Edited by Susanna Trnka, Christine Dureau and Julie Park
- 11 Environmental Anthropology**
Future Directions
Edited by Helen Kopnina and Eleanor Shoreman-Ouimet
- 12 Times of Security**
Ethnographies of Fear, Protest and the Future
Edited by Martin Holbraad and Morten Axel Pedersen

Times of Security

Ethnographies of Fear, Protest and the Future

**Edited by Martin Holbraad and
Morten Axel Pedersen**

 **Routledge**
Taylor & Francis Group
NEW YORK LONDON

First published 2013
by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Simultaneously published in the UK
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

*Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group,
an informa business*

© 2013 Taylor & Francis

The right of Martin Holbraad and Morten Axel Pedersen to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

Trademark Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Times of security : ethnographies of fear, protest, and the future /
[edited by] Martin Holbraad, Morten Axel Pedersen.

pages cm. — (Routledge studies in anthropology ; 12)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Human security—Cross-cultural studies. 2. National security—
Cross-cultural studies. 3. Social movements—Cross-cultural
studies. I. Holbraad, Martin, editor of compilation. II. Pedersen,
Morten Axel, 1969– editor of compilation.

JC571.T528 2013

355'.033—dc23

2012051459

ISBN13: 978-0-415-62859-4 (hbk)

ISBN13: 978-0-203-07785-6 (ebk)

Typeset in Sabon
by IBT Global.



SUSTAINABLE
FORESTRY
INITIATIVE

SFI label applies to the text stock

Certified Sourcing
www.sfioprogram.org
SFI-01234

Printed and bound in the United States of America
by IBT Global.

Contents

<i>List of Figures</i>	vii
<i>Foreword and Acknowledgments</i>	ix
Introduction: Times of Security MORTEN AXEL PEDERSEN AND MARTIN HOLBRAAD	1
Defining Security in Late Liberalism: A Comment on Pedersen and Holbraad ELIZABETH A. POVINELLI	28
1 Security Is a Collective Body: Intersecting Times of Security in the Copenhagen Climate Summit STINE KRØIJER	33
2 “Captured with Their Hands in the Dough”: Insecurity, Safety-Seeking, and Securitization in El Alto, Bolivia HELENE RISØR	57
3 Readings of Time: Of Coca, Presentiment, and Illicit Passage in Peru RICHARD KERNAGHAN	80
4 Seizing Catastrophes: The Temporality of Nakba among Palestinians in Denmark ANJA KUBLITZ	103
5 Enduring Presents: Living a Prison Sentence as the Wife of a Detainee in Israel LOTTE BUCH SEGAL	122

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

vi *Contents*

6	Parasecurity and Paratime in Serbia: Neocortical Defence and National Consciousness	141
	MAJA PETROVIĆ-ŠTEGER	
7	Bad Weather: The Time of Planetary Crisis	163
	JOSEPH MASCO	
8	Time Consciousness in North Korea's State Security Discourse	198
	HEONIK KWON	
	Afterword: Notes on Securitization and Temporality	213
	STEFFEN JENSEN AND FINN STEPPUTAT	
	<i>Contributors</i>	223
	<i>Index</i>	227

Figures

2.1	Criminal Sign: Stones and coca leaves.	64
2.2	Sidewalk where dead bodies have been found.	68
2.3	Taxi on the run.	70
2.4	Bicycle thief 1.	72
2.5	Bicycle thief 2.	72
2.6	Bicycle thief 3.	73
7.1	The trees of Operation Upshot-Knothole.	164
7.2	Building the test forest at the Nevada Test Site.	167
7.3	'Mike', thermonuclear detonation.	169
7.4	Hurricane Katrina hitting the Gulf Coast.	184



Foreword and Acknowledgments

This volume originates in collaborative research on the anthropology of security conducted under the aegis of the Centre for Advanced Security Theory (CAST) at the Department of Political Science of the University of Copenhagen, funded by the University's Centre of Excellence programme. In his role of research coordinator at CAST, it was Morten Axel Pedersen's task to add an anthropological dimension to the Centre's research on securitization theory—a model for understanding the construction of security threats developed since the mid-1990s by the Centre's leader, Ole Wæver, and his associates, forming what has come to be known as the Copenhagen School of security studies. From 2008 to 2012, Pedersen organized two workshops at CAST, set up the 'Anthropology and Security Reading Group', comprising mainly research students from the Department of Anthropology at Copenhagen, and invited Martin Holbraad from University College London for a three-month stint as visiting researcher at CAST in 2009. Pedersen and Holbraad's joint research in this period focused on placing securitization theory within the context of the burgeoning literature on the anthropology of security, and exploring its purchase on different ethnographic contexts. Resulting in a separate publication devoted to a sustained anthropological engagement with the Copenhagen School's model of securitization for an IR readership (Holbraad and Pedersen 2012), this initial stint of research also set the terms for the broader anthropological exploration of the relationship between security and time that led to the present volume. For helping shape many of his ideas in this exploratory stage of research, Pedersen would like to thank in particular the students in his Anthropology of Security class, taught in the Department of Anthropology at Copenhagen in spring 2011.

With the exception of Joseph Masco's chapter, which is based on an article previously published in *Social Studies of Science* (40, no. 1 (2010): 7–14—we thank CAST for funding the reprint), the chapters of this volume were developed in the two workshops held at CAST in 2009 and 2011. In addition to the volume's contributors, we thank Nils Bubandt, Heiko Henkel, Regnar Kristensen, Lucia Michelutti, Birgitte

x *Foreword and Acknowledgments*

1 Refslund Sørensen, Henrik Vigh, and Sari Wastell for their participa-
2 tion in these events. At CAST, we thank Ole Wæver for his intellectual
3 engagement, encouragement, and support throughout our collaboration;
4 Mats Fridlund, Henning Koch, Ida Sofie Matzen, Noel Parker, Karen
5 Lund Petersen, and Lise Philipsen for helping us find our feet in the field
6 of security studies and cognate topics, and for their stimulating engage-
7 ment in our cross-disciplinary dialogues; Peter Markus Kristensen,
8 Anne Kathrine Mikkelsen Nyborg, and their fellow ‘student helpers’ at
9 CAST for all their kind and superefficient legwork; and Jytte Bertelsen,
10 the Centre’s administrative lynchpin and all-round enabler, for her ever-
11 resourceful support in all aspects of our collaboration with the Centre.

12 We are indebted to Steffen Jensen, Finn Stepputat and Sari Wastell for
13 providing perceptive comments on a draft of the introduction, as well as
14 to an anonymous reviewer for Routledge, whose critical commentary on
15 the whole manuscript was invaluable. We are also immensely grateful to
16 Beth Povinelli for her critique of our coauthored introduction, which we
17 have included in the volume as a ‘comment’ on our text, and to Steffen
18 Jensen and Finn Stepputat for providing the afterword, which rounds off
19 the volume so expertly. Finally, we wish to thank Max Novick at Rout-
20 ledge, whose editorial care and advice have been catalytic at all stages of
21 the book’s production, as well as Eleanor Chan and Dina Dineva for their
22 assistance in preparing the manuscript.

23
24 London and Copenhagen, April 2013
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

Introduction

Times of Security

*Morten Axel Pedersen and
Martin Holbraad*

INTRODUCTION

Security, like climate change and the global financial crisis, is on everyone's lips. But what is security from an anthropological perspective? What does being secure, and insecure, look like for the people we study, and how might this compare to how anthropologists themselves, as well as other social scientists and commentators, imagine security when they broach it analytically? Furthermore, given the irreducibly temporal, future-oriented character of security, how do particular ideas about, and experiences of, *time* play into such images? By exploring and comparing overlapping and often conflicting 'times of security' in a variety of ethnographic contexts, this volume seeks to pave the way for a distinctively anthropological approach to the study of security and insecurity that deploys the classic anthropological method of cross-cultural comparison to pose new questions about the nature of security, and experiments with novel ways of answering them. Such a comparative ethnography of the times of security holds considerable promise for producing new insights, not just for the discipline of anthropology, but for security studies and its political theory more generally. Focusing on the multiple concepts of, and concerns with, temporality in different securitized environments across the globe, this volume brings together anthropologists who have conducted long-term fieldwork in contexts of fear, protest, and other securitized arenas, ranging from the everyday insecurities of the wives of Palestinian detainees in Israel and the role of violence in Bolivian revolutionary populism, to the political imaginaries of Serbian and North Korean nationalists and the utopian goals of left-wing radicals in Europe.

While in recent years much interesting ethnography has been produced of different securitized contexts across the world, anthropologists writing about security often operate with an implicit, and for that reason theoretically unsatisfactory, set of ideas about what 'security' might mean as an anthropological concept (as opposed to a theme in political science or a policy buzzword). We agree with Daniel Goldstein, then, that "the insights drawn from ethnographic research have not [yet] been systematically

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

2 Morten Axel Pedersen and Martin Holbraad

1 brought to bear on theorization of security” (2010, 488). The guiding idea
2 that brings together the chapters of this book is that a comparative ethnog-
3 raphy of the temporality of threats, dangers, and fears in different settings
4 can contribute directly to a broader understanding of how (in)security—its
5 fears and fantasies, along with the revolutions and the violence that are
6 frequently carried out in its name—is experienced, managed, and mitigated
7 in the contemporary world. Thus anthropologists need to ask what visions
8 of the future and of time itself are at stake when security becomes an issue
9 for people: what, and when, are *times of security*? For example, is there a
10 specific temporality, or constellation of temporalities, that is intrinsic to
11 the discourses and practices of security within socialist and other nonlib-
12 eral projects? How are times of security played out in contexts of weak or
13 absent state power, where alternative concepts of security and modalities
14 of security practices may proliferate? Which temporalities of fear and dan-
15 ger may be identified in global political groupings and transnational social
16 movements, and how might these give rise to new forms of securitization
17 and resistance? How does security, and its times, look from the perspec-
18 tives of the different agents on which it operates?

19 The central thesis of this book, then, is that (in)security can be simulta-
20 neously enacted within and across multiple temporal logics, whose complex
21 imbrications may be studied ethnographically and compared with other
22 times of security. For example, the time of security may be imagined in
23 linear and progressive terms as a future state of certainty devoid of all risk
24 (Beck 1992), or conversely may be cast as a matter of eschatology, imply-
25 ing that security is a divine state that cannot be attained—or not, at least,
26 in a future that can be foreseen (Guyer 2007). Alternatively, the time of
27 security might be conceived as having a cyclical nature, with certain forms
28 of ceremonial action repeated periodically for it to be maintained over
29 time (Kwon and Chung 2012). Yet in other ethnographic contexts, such as
30 among left-radical groups (Maeckelbergh 2009; Krøijer this volume), secu-
31 rity may be thought of as an immanent potential present that remains invis-
32 ible under normal conditions, and becomes visible during brief moments of
33 revelation—like a sort of ‘political dreamtime’ akin to cosmological ideas
34 among Australia’s Aborigines (Stanner 2009).

35 In this introductory chapter we seek to establish a theoretical framework
36 for the comparative ethnographic study of different times of security, plac-
37 ing the question of time and security in relation to two contiguous bodies
38 of literature: on the one hand, the well-established literature on security
39 studies within international relations, and, on the other, the rather more
40 scattered body of anthropological work on security. In what follows, we
41 make the case for a comparative study of the multiple visions of security,
42 fear, and the future in different social and political contexts, and discuss
43 how the contributions to the volume further this agenda. Our overarching
44 message is that security has always been a central if often latent concern in
45 the history of anthropology and related fields, and that the question of time
46

offers a potentially germane analytical vector for studying security ethnographically on a comparative scale.

THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF SECURITY

As has been pointed out by scholars straddling the disciplinary divide between anthropology and international relations (e.g., Weldes et al. 1999b; Kent 2006), anthropology has much to offer security studies by problematising the multifarious forms of (in)security not covered by conventional, so-called ‘narrow’ approaches in international relations, which tend to focus on security mainly in military contexts and interstate affairs. But the inspiration also goes the other way: security and security studies have begun to inform the work of an increasing number of anthropologists. As Hamilton and Placas note in a recent review article, security has emerged “as a key area of anthropological investigation, one that is inextricably intertwined with neoliberalism but that also cuts across interests in politics, human rights, crime, health, and more” (2011, 254). In fact, it is hard to disagree with Goldstein in seeing “the potential of a broader comparative ethnography of security, one that would place security at the center of global society and its contemporary problematics, revealing the important ways in which ‘security’ in its many forms is operative in the daily lives and communities of the people with whom anthropologists work” (2010, 488).

Still, considering how promising the prospects for an anthropology of security seem to be, it is striking how few anthropologists have heeded this timely call—or so it would appear, at any rate, if one operates with a narrow and literal definition of security (and, indeed, anthropology). Understood in the strictest sense, the anthropology of security is confined to anthropological work that explicitly labels itself as being ‘about’ security—and the list here would be relatively short (e.g., Weldes et al. 1999a; Buur, Jensen, and Stepputat 2007; Gusterson and Besteman 2009; Eriksen, Bal, and Salemink 2010; Ochs 2011; McNamara and Rubenstein 2011; Albro et al. 2011). Another, still narrow, definition includes studies by anthropologists focusing on conflicts (including wars) between states or other sovereign bodies. This produces a longer list of works, many of which are concerned with countries involved in the Cold War and its aftermath (Gusterson 1996, 2004; Masco 2006; Lutz 2009; Kwon and Chung 2012), or, rather particularly, with tensions between the state of Israel and its Arab neighbours (Kelly 2006; Feldmann 2008). Alternatively, the anthropology of security may be expanded to include any ethnographic work exploring the relationship between aid and security in the post-9/11 world, including the increasing use of private security contractors to perform tasks that used to be monopolized by states or suprastate actors such as the UN (Duffield 2007; Lutz 2006). Finally, one might include all anthropological works that more or less implicitly explore (in)security discourses and practices within

1 contexts situated beyond the state-centric concerns of traditional, ‘narrow’
2 security studies, such as, to mention a handful of the most influential such
3 studies, Taussig (1992), Feldman (1991), Das (2006), Vigh (2006), and Pov-
4 inelli (2011).

5 Thus, as Goldstein also points out, “anthropological research with an
6 explicit security dimension has mostly been focused on the U.S. and (most
7 publicly, at least) on matters of disciplinary collaboration with the U.S.
8 security establishment. . . . Meanwhile, anthropology of the non-Western
9 world, even when concerned with issues that might be considered within
10 a broader ‘security’ rubric, has generally not been framed in these terms”
11 (2010, 488). Yet, as he continues, “many issues that have historically preoc-
12 cupied anthropology are today inextricably linked to security themes and
13 that anthropology, even when not explicitly concerned with security per
14 se, expresses a characteristic approach to topics that today must be con-
15 sidered within a security framework” (ibid., 489). In other words, a case
16 could be made that the question of security has been an integral but largely
17 implicit component of the anthropological project from its inception. This
18 is precisely the point that we would like to make in this section: that, far
19 from representing a new subfield of political anthropology, security lies at
20 the heart of the anthropological discipline as a whole. In fact, one might
21 even say that the history of anthropology itself could be rewritten as a
22 story about security. Indeed, while this broader theoretical undertaking is
23 beyond our present concerns, it is instructive to single out a couple of key
24 figures in the history of British social anthropology who furnish a good
25 point of departure for reflecting critically about the manner in which ideas
26 of security have been embedded in the anthropological project itself—a
27 venture that takes us straight back to the origins of social anthropological
28 thinking in so-called functionalist and structural-functionalist arguments.

29 More than any other school of anthropological thought, function-
30 alism can be said to turn on a notion of security, albeit implicitly. After
31 all, is that not the underlying trope behind the “table of basic needs” for-
32 mulated by Malinowski (1944, 41) in his attempt to theorise the esoteric
33 ideas and exotic practices of his Trobriand subjects: the need for security
34 as a universal human predicament? True, as Marshall Sahlins points out,
35 for Malinowski “it is as if culture were a sustained metaphor on the bio-
36 logical functions of digestion. In the last analysis, culture is referable to
37 practical-organic utility” (1977, 73–74). Yet, one might wonder whether
38 this biological reductionism of Malinowski and his followers was, in fact,
39 an allegory for a more basic set of understandings of what humans are in
40 the first place—namely, in this particular case, angst-ridden individuals
41 in pursuit of existential certainty. As Thomas Hylland Eriksen has put it,
42 “life in the Melanesian societies studied by the likes of Bronislaw Mal-
43 inowski . . . seemed profoundly insecure; people appeared to live in peren-
44 nial fear of either witchcraft attacks or witchcraft accusations, and there
45 were status anxieties associated with political power, gifting obligations
46

towards relatives and economic uncertainties” (2010, 3). Indeed, this is one of Malinowski’s core theoretical (as opposed to methodological) legacies to anthropology: the undertheorised and, in our view, unwarranted assumption that magic and religion are symbolic tools by which individuals seek to make sense of, manage, and mitigate the hardships and uncertainties of life (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999; cf. Pedersen 2011, 29–34).

Turning now to Radcliffe-Brown’s structural-functionalism (and to mid-twentieth-century British social anthropology more generally), we also find a tacit ‘anthropology of security’—the key difference being that with structuralism-functionalism, the unit of security (i.e., that which needs to be protected from threat) is transposed from the angst-ridden existential subject, as with Malinowski, to an order-obsessed social, cultural, and moral collective, or simply: society. Indeed, as is well known, Radcliffe-Brown formulated his functionalism as a direct critique of Malinowski and his followers. Debates regarding the ‘function’ of magic and religion in human social and cultural life provide a good example. Contrary to what Malinowski had argued in both his early ethnographic studies and his later attempts at theoretical synthesis, for Radcliffe-Brown phenomena such as magic and religion could not explain anything in their own right: just like his primary intellectual influence, Durkheim, he took religion to be a product of the social rather than its precondition. Since, as Radcliffe-Brown put it with thinly disguised reference to Malinowski: “while one anthropological theory is that magic and religion give men confidence, comfort, and a sense of security, it could equally well be argued that they give rise to fears and anxieties from which they could otherwise be free—the fear of black magic or of spirits, fear of God, of the Devil, of Hell” (1952, 146). But if magic and religion do not install “a sense of security” in people as Malinowski thought, what, then, does? Whence the origin of the “freedom” from “fears and anxieties” that “men”, according to Radcliffe-Brown, would “otherwise” be in? From the structural-functionalist perspective, the answer can only be society itself—that sacred ‘social thing’, comprising the totality of relations between people according to Durkheim and his followers. As Radcliffe-Brown put it in one of the rare cases in which he used the term *security*: “In such a primitive society as that of the Andamans one of the most powerful means of maintaining the cohesion of the society and of enforcing that conformity to custom and tradition without which social life is impossible, is the recognition by the individual that for his security and well-being he depends entirely upon the society” (1977, 85).

In sum, as much for Radcliffe-Brown as for Malinowski, certain tacit assumptions about security—what it is, how one might gain or lose it—lay at the heart of functionalist models, as well as, it could be added, the British colonial project to which their research was indirectly wedded (Stocking 1991). But if Malinowski’s ‘sense of security’ was psychological (viz. the angst-ridden individual), for Radcliffe-Brown and other structural-functionalists, security was essentially a *political* category. Ultimately, such was

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

1 Hobbesian truth to which each Andaman person intuitively subscribed,
 2 on Radcliffe-Brown's account: that, were it not for "society" and its "con-
 3 formity to custom and tradition", every islander would be left at his or
 4 her own mercy subject to a state of nature, "where man is Enemy to every
 5 man [and] man live without other security, than what their own strength,
 6 and their own invention shall furnish them withall" (Hobbes in *Leviathan*,
 7 Chapter 8, cited in Sahlins 1974, 176).¹

8 So, what does this discussion of mid-twentieth-century British social
 9 anthropology tell us about modern anthropology of security? It seems to
 10 us that the problem with much recent anthropological work on security
 11 is that, with a few notable exceptions (e.g., Bubandt 2005; Masco 2006;
 12 Goldstein 2010), this incipient field of scholarship tends to remain caught
 13 up in the same tacit assumptions and dichotomies that characterised Mal-
 14 inowski's and Radcliffe-Brown's respective security anthropologies several
 15 generations ago. More precisely, we find, much of the burgeoning anthro-
 16 pological scholarship on security shares with early and mid-twentieth-cen-
 17 tury British social anthropology the unquestioned and in our view dubious
 18 assumption that human lives are based on and revolve around the tension
 19 between two distinct realms—namely, on the one hand, the realm of 'the
 20 individual' imbued with capacities for choice, agency, and freedom, and on
 21 the other, the realm of 'the society' imbued with capacities for regulation,
 22 organisation, and ordering more generally (cf. Ingold et al. 1996).

23 Contemporary political anthropology in general and the incipient
 24 anthropology of security in particular, we thus suggest, lack a clear and
 25 sustained focus on (in)securities that are located neither outside single indi-
 26 viduals nor, necessarily, within singular 'societies' or sovereign bodies like
 27 nation-states. To substantiate this point, let us consider one of the most
 28 vibrant subfields within political anthropology over recent years—namely,
 29 the body of literature on themes such as 'social suffering', 'existential uncer-
 30 tainty', and cognate themes (Biehl 2005; Jackson 2005; Kleinman 2006).
 31 Of particular interest for our present purposes is the fact that many of the
 32 scholars who have contributed to this important branch of current anthro-
 33 pological scholarship make it very explicit that they consider these phe-
 34 nomena to share the same transcultural referent—namely, the individual
 35 sufferer of uncertainty. Thus, while such scholars are careful to emphasise
 36 that they consider the intersubjective to precede the subjective in ontologi-
 37 cal terms (and by implication that there is no such thing as a transcenden-
 38 tal individual), the fact remains that their fundamental unit of analysis is
 39 always the single human subject, whose relationship to the world—including
 40 people—is cast as inherently uncertain.

41 Take as an illustration of this widespread "existentialist universalism"
 42 (Pedersen 2011, 33) Linda Green's chapter "Living in a State of Fear" from
 43 the well-known volume *Fieldwork under Fire* (Nordstrom and Robben
 44 1995). Based on fieldwork in Guatemala, Green's objective is to explore
 45 "the insecurity that permeates individual women's lives wracked by worries
 46

of physical and emotional survival, of grotesque memories, of ongoing militarization, of chronic fear” (1995, 105). At the purely descriptive level, the text accomplishes this goal abundantly and convincingly. Green’s prose conveys an almost visceral sense of what it means to be living in a context of political terror, and in this way the text makes an important contribution to the anthropological study of state violence as an endemic condition. However, one may question whether Green’s text tells us anything specific about the nature of *security* as an object of ethnographic investigation and comparison. While she uses the terms ‘security’ and ‘insecurity’ frequently, one gets the impression that she might as well have used terms such as ‘danger’ or ‘uncertainty’. At any rate, throughout her text, these expressions appear to be used in ways that are basically synonymous with her generalised notion of ‘fear’.

Green’s text is indicative of what we see as a broader problem with the conceptualisation of security in writings in political anthropology that focus on social suffering, political violence, state terror, and cognate phenomena—namely, that the subjects of ‘insecurity’ (i.e., the entities under threat) are typically assumed to be individual persons. In the case of Green’s ethnography, for example, at issue are individual Maya women, as well as Green herself as an ethnographer. Hence, while ‘insecurity’ is presented as having been pervasive, omnipresent, and permanent during Green’s fieldwork, its locus is always within the minds and bodies of single subjects. In this respect, her text, alongside much other recent anthropological work on (in)security, calls to mind what we previously identified as Malinowski’s theory of the human condition—his ‘anthropology’—as an angst-ridden individual in pursuit of existential certainty.

Yet, one could ask, is insecurity always the same as uncertainty? It seems to us that an opportunity to fine-tune the theoretical vocabulary of political anthropology is missed by automatically identifying (in)security with (un)certainty, collapsing the meanings of two concepts that are distinct, and were arguably also understood to have separate meanings throughout much of the history of anthropological thinking. That, after all, is what the difference between Malinowski’s and Radcliffe-Brown’s functionalism boils down to: a fundamental contrast between ‘*un/certainty*’, defined as a subjective existential predicament, and ‘*in/security*’, defined as an irreducible property of the political arrangements of social collectives?

To flesh out this distinction between uncertainty and insecurity, it is instructive to consider Lotte Buch Segal’s chapter in the present volume. Through her subtle ethnography, Buch Segal shows how the everyday lives of wives of Palestinian detainees are influenced by Israeli state security procedures pertaining to their husbands’ imprisonment. More specifically, Buch Segal describes how the security procedures for incarcerating and therefore visiting Palestinian detainees render it impossible for their absence as husbands (or fathers, or sons) to fade into the background. In that sense, she argues, these women become captives of an “immediate

1 present” that never fades into the past or future, because, as soon as tasks
 2 pertaining to their husbands’ imprisonment seem completed, they must be
 3 repeated. Far from engendering a sense of temporal progression, the cir-
 4 cumstance of lengthy incarceration thus serves to “contract” time: the lives
 5 of detainees’ wives remain in the present. Thus understood, Buch Segal’s
 6 account of Amina, Fatemeh, and Aisha (three Palestinian women visiting
 7 their detained husbands in an Israeli prison) shows how the *uncertainties*
 8 of families and individuals are elevated into *insecurities* through the state
 9 security procedures around which detainees’ wives are forced to structure
 10 their lives.

11 Along the same line of thinking, Helene Risør’s chapter on safety-seek-
 12 ing practices among residents of El Alto in Bolivia can be construed as
 13 an exploration of the mutual imbrication of uncertainty and insecurity.
 14 In the poor urban periphery of a populist socialist Latin American state,
 15 shows Risør, seeking safety is not so much a matter of avoiding known
 16 dangers but of recognising and making visible criminal intentions in seem-
 17 ingly ordinary persons and mundane everyday activities and events. For
 18 residents or ‘neighbours’ (as they call themselves), this involves a vernacular
 19 security semiotics, in which ‘signs’ from everyday life—like a taxi pass-
 20 ing by, or footprints in the mud—are deciphered in the hope of catching
 21 criminals “with their hands in the dough”. Here, both *uncertainty* and
 22 *insecurity* emerge as effects rather than preconditions of peoples’ efforts
 23 to make visible the figure of the criminal. Indeed, in this context it would
 24 appear that there is a breakdown of the very distinction between everyday
 25 practices of safety-seeking, which in our terms would pertain directly to
 26 the personal realm of uncertainty, and exceptional security measures puta-
 27 tively promoting safety in the community of ‘neighbours’ as a whole. As we
 28 discuss in more general terms ahead, and as Risør’s chapter demonstrates
 29 in vivid ethnographic detail, such conceptual breakdowns undermine the
 30 liberal political-cosmological edifice on which the contrast between rules
 31 and exceptions, so central to prominent theorisations of security in politi-
 32 cal theory, is based.

33 So, part of our aim in this volume is to explore the theoretical mileage
 34 that may be gained by decoupling the two concepts of ‘uncertainty’ and
 35 ‘insecurity’ in the comparative ethnographic study of politics. Thus, in our
 36 understanding, insecurity is uncertainty elevated to an existential matter—
 37 not, however, in the ‘existentialist’ sense of a universal human predicament
 38 of individual angst, nor, equally crucially, in the sociocentric sense of a
 39 societal bulwark against a nonsocial state of nature. Rather, we take secu-
 40 rity to be a culturally, socially, and historically variable political affect that
 41 can be parsed as a matter of confronting ‘existential threats’ to collectives
 42 of various orders and scales.

43 Documenting individual people’s fears in contexts of structural violence,
 44 as Green and many of the aforementioned anthropologists who have worked
 45 in politically volatile settings do, is certainly important, politically as well as
 46

anthropologically. But the challenge for an anthropology of security that can leave its mark within and beyond the discipline, we would argue, is to incorporate also an analytical attention to the extraindividual dimension of security identified by Radcliffe-Brown and Durkheim several generations ago, without thereby reverting to their reified conception of ‘society’ as a thing in itself that demands order as some kind of socio-ontic telos of its own. To paraphrase Marilyn Strathern (2004, 36), such a project involves studying and comparing units of security that are more than individual but less than societal. In this vein, and strictly for heuristic (nonreifying!) purposes as we shall explain further later, we may venture a working definition of security as *a set of discourses and practices concerned with a given social collective’s reproduction over time*. In addition to steering away from matters of personal uncertainty, such an appeal to the quintessentially anthropological idea of social reproduction has the virtue of introducing time as the most immanent dimension of security—a central stake in the argument of the present volume, as will be discussed in more detail ahead.

In what remains of this introduction, we discuss what the anthropology of security might be if it is not reduced to the study of social suffering and state violence within a neoliberal world of increasing uncertainty and generalised existential angst. With a view to sowing the theoretical seeds for a genuinely social (extraindividual) concept of security able to escape the conceptual pitfalls identified earlier, we begin by considering a school of political theory that does not automatically posit the individual as the basic unit of (in)security, without at the same reverting to the state-centric bias of traditional international relations—namely, the strand of security studies known as securitization theory.

SECURITIZATION THEORY AND LIBERAL POLITICAL COSMOLOGY

Security permeates the history of Western political thought—from Plato to NATO, as a memorably titled undergraduate course in political theory at the London School of Economics used to have it. The conceptual possibilities of the term *security* itself, however, have arguably received their most explicit and reflexive treatment under the stricter banner of security studies, pursued as a subfield of the political scientific study of international relations. While reviewing the literature in this field is beyond our present remit, our concern with specifying the anthropological mileage of security as a concept can be framed usefully with reference to similar debates about the concept’s contours within security studies. Indeed, as we shall see, recent attempts within the field to define the concept of security in relation to processes of so-called ‘securitization’ provide a particularly useful starting point for our own attempt to render the idea of security precise enough to be anthropologically productive.

1 Overviews of security studies as a branch of IR typically present the
2 story of the field's development as one of progressive 'widening' (Jahn,
3 Lemaitre, and Wæver 1987; Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998). At its
4 inception, according to this account, the agenda of security studies was
5 driven above all by the political exigencies of the Cold War and thus main-
6 tained a 'narrow' focus on matters of military-political conflict within the
7 context of the international state system. Over the decades since the end
8 of the Cold War, however, with concerns with security sprawling into ever
9 new areas of public and political discourse, the academic concept of secu-
10 rity has been 'widened' well beyond just military concerns, to address mat-
11 ters of economic, environmental, energy, and even 'human' security, as a
12 UN-sponsored charter for the protection of individual human beings on
13 a universal, transnational scale put it (UNDP 1994; cf. Eriksen, Bal, and
14 Saleminck 2010). As is the case within the discipline of anthropology itself,
15 then, recent years have seen a veritable rush to the notion of security, not
16 least in the post-9/11 era, in which security became a byword for all man-
17 ner of research. Inevitably, however, and as a number of reviewers of this
18 literature point out, this move to widen the agenda of security studies has
19 brought with it the danger of conceptual confusion, "endanger[ing] the
20 intellectual coherence of security, putting so much into it that its essential
21 meaning became void" (Buzan Wæver, and de Wilde 1998, 2).

22 Since one of our main aims in this introduction is to redress a similar
23 issue of conceptual haziness in the anthropological literature on security,
24 it pays to examine rather closely the ways in which the concept of security
25 has been resharpened within security studies in response to such charges of
26 excessive 'widening'. With this aim, we turn particularly to the development
27 of securitization theory, associated with the so-called Copenhagen School
28 of security studies. As we propose to show, the way security is approached
29 in securitization theory provides some of the rudiments for a properly
30 anthropological conceptualisation: one that is open enough to encompass
31 all the kinds of social phenomena one would wish to understand in terms of
32 ideas of security, and at the same time sharp enough heuristically to delimit
33 security as a distinct field of ethnographic investigation.

34 Developed by IR scholars Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver and their stu-
35 dents and associates since the late 1990s, securitization theory is presented
36 explicitly as a way of pursuing the newly 'widened' agenda of security stud-
37 ies in order to provide a clear account of "what is and what is not a security
38 issue . . . and locate the relevant security dynamics of different types of
39 security on levels ranging from local through regional to global" (Buzan
40 Wæver, and de Wilde 1998, 1). As Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde put it: "To
41 study securitization is to study the power politics of a concept. Based on
42 a clear idea of the nature of security, securitization [theory] aims to gain
43 an increasingly precise understanding of who securitizes, on what issues
44 (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results, and, not
45 least, under what conditions" (ibid., 32). In this account, then, 'security'
46

is a particular kind of speech act that can be successful only under certain felicity conditions. Crucially, security comes to be at issue in situations in which “a securitizing actor uses a rhetoric of existential threat and thereby takes an issue out of what under those conditions is ‘normal politics’ . . . Thus the exact definition and criteria of securitization is constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a salience sufficient to have substantial political effects” (ibid., 25).

In offering an open-ended and formal frame for investigating concrete political discourses and practices, rather than a metaphysical or normative treatise on ‘the nature of security’ as such, securitization theory comes close to the aspiration of much anthropological work (Holbraad and Pedersen 2012). After all, the core claim of securitization theory—namely, that ‘security’ involves passing from one social order (‘ordinary politics’) to another (the extrapolitical realm of ‘emergency’)—exemplifies a manner of analysis in which anthropologists have for long been invested: that of accounting for the content of social phenomena with reference to the ‘logic’ of their articulation. Indeed, this sympathy with securitization theory has already begun to be explored in anthropology, notably by Nils Bubandt, who draws on some of its ideas in his analysis of certain transformations of political discourse in post-Suharto Indonesia (2005), Alexandra Kent, who takes an explicitly Copenhagen School approach to the study of Cambodian religious politics (2006), and Daniel Goldstein in his writings on the security in contemporary Bolivia and its role within anthropology more generally (2010; see also Gledhill 2008 and Holbraad and Pedersen 2012).

Here, however, we want to emphasise two points—one positive, the other critical—about how bringing securitization theory into the fray can help to sharpen the notion of security for anthropological purposes. The first point relates to how the Copenhagen School’s emphasis on security as a particular manner of *politicising* issues—specifically, of casting them into the ‘extrapolitical’ realm of emergency laws and exceptions—helps to correct the tendency in recent anthropological writings to view insecurity as a matter of individual subjects’ sense of existential uncertainty, as discussed earlier. Calling to mind structural-functionalist anthropological concerns with security as a political property of societal forms, the Copenhagen School posits security firmly at the level of political process and the different forms social collectives might take. Indeed, drawing on our earlier discussion of the contrast between (Malinowskian) ‘un/certainty’, seen as a subjective existential predicament, and (Radcliffe-Brownian) ‘in/security’, seen as an irreducible property of the political arrangements of social collectives, one might say that the Copenhagen School’s emphasis on security as a manner of politicisation allows us to view in/security as a *strong form of un/certainty*. By ‘strong’, here, we mean essentially a way of scaling up the issue of un/certainty, such that matters of security pertain not, in the first instance, to the individual/existential predicaments of single subjects, but rather to their social and cultural conditions of possibility at ‘higher’ orders of collectivity,

1 the existential threats that such societal forms may be deemed to confront,
2 and the manner of political response they may engender.

3 Still, the Durkheimian virtue of defining security with reference to social
4 rather than individual existential threats also carries its own conceptual
5 dangers. In this connection, our more critical point about securitization
6 theory homes in precisely on the role the very distinction between the social
7 and the individual (and cognate distinctions such as political/nonpolitical,
8 sovereign/subject, and rule/exception) plays in its articulation. The move
9 from neo-Malinowskian individualism to what looks like a correspondingly
10 neostructural-functionalist sociologism, we suggest, hardly constitutes the
11 kind of theoretical leap that is necessary to make security operative as an
12 anthropological concept. Indeed, this counts as a critique not only of secu-
13 ritization theory, but also of the baseline anthropological assumption that
14 human lives are structured around a dynamic clash between societal ver-
15 sus individual forces. In this respect, we argue, securitization theory and
16 anthropological concerns with social reproduction alike are trapped within
17 what we will call a distinctly ‘liberal political cosmology’. Let us demon-
18 strate this with reference to the Copenhagen School, as a way of showing
19 critically the kinds of questions one can bring into view if one is prepared
20 to depart from liberal political cosmology to forge a properly comparative
21 anthropology of security.

22 To establish this point it pays to consider one of the Copenhagen
23 School’s most cited definitions of security as a passage from normal to
24 special politics:

25
26 “Security” is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules
27 of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or
28 as above politics. Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme ver-
29 sion of politicisation. In theory, any public issue can be located on the
30 spectrum ranging from nonpoliticised (meaning the state does not deal
31 with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and
32 decision) through politicised (meaning the issue is part of public policy,
33 requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely,
34 some other form of communal governance) to securitized (meaning the
35 issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency mea-
36 sures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political pro-
37 cedure). (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998, 23–24)

38
39 The authors make amply clear that this model of securitization is meant to
40 have a purchase on a wide variety of empirical circumstances, and need not
41 always pertain only to the role of the state and its military (1998, 24)—this
42 being their move to ‘widen’ the agenda of earlier state- and military-cen-
43 tric theorisations of security. Nevertheless, one can also glean from the
44 foregoing formulation that in its “paradigmatic form”, to borrow Juha
45 Vuori’s formulation (2008), securitization theory does speak directly to
46

long-standing concerns in political theory and indeed political anthropology regarding the relationship between subjects and sovereigns (or, more specifically, citizens and states) and the role of political processes in calibrating that relationship. Indeed one way to characterise the three levels of the model—for consistency let us call them ‘nonpolitical’, ‘political’, and ‘extrapolitical’—would be to correlate them in just these terms. The nonpolitical realm, then, is the purported realm in which subjects act in relative autonomy from the sovereign power. Conversely, the extrapolitical realm of securitization is the assumed condition in which the sovereign power acts in relative autonomy from its subjects, by way of emergency measures that have not been legitimated through the ordinary political channels. And ‘politics’ stands in the middle as the buffer-realm, in which the competing pressures of subjects’ and sovereigns’ autonomy are supposedly kept in balance. On their side, subjects recognise that their concerns can be dealt with only within the framework of rules that the authority of the sovereign power is able to guarantee. On its side, the sovereign power recognises that its authority over subjects depends on the ‘legitimate’ exercise of its power, which requires that, under ordinary circumstances, it too must abide by the framework of rules or laws with whose guarantee it is entrusted. Framed in this way, the paradigmatic form of securitization is a tilting of just this balance of competing claims to autonomy: securitization becomes a process in which the sovereign power’s capacity for autonomy is given precedence over the constraints of ordinary political arrangements.

The tacit assumption underpinning securitization theory, then, is the mutual relativization of autonomous selves and sovereign bodies: imagined as belonging to separate realms of reality, the people themselves and the political structures and the social processes to which their lives are subject exist in relative autonomy from one another, and politics is the field in which these relative capacities for autonomy are brought into relation with each other. It is just this image of distinct realms that we consider as the liberal cosmology of securitization theory, according to which the world consists of persons (conceived as ‘individuals’ or ‘subjects’) who are ‘free’ inasmuch as they retain their integrity and autonomy with respect to the political structures by which they are governed.² Seen from this perspective, ‘security’ represents the optimal point of balance, so to speak, between contrasting individual wills and collective goals (Rothschild 1995; Rose 1999; Burke 2002).

To be sure, this way of thinking about security has an immediate anthropological purchase in all sorts of ethnographic contexts. It would certainly be hard to imagine a corner of the globe that remains unaffected by the hegemonic influence of liberal politics—the very notion of a nation-state, for a start, embodies much of its conceptual apparatus (Hobbsbawm 1992), as does, of course, the modern citizen and the associated subject-positions and forms of discipline and governmentality.³ Buch Segal’s account of the ways in which Israeli military-political sovereignty over Palestine literally

1 operates upon detainees' temporal horizons, as described earlier, is only
 2 one of the myriad ways in which this tussle between ontologically separable
 3 'sovereigns' and 'subjects' is played out across the globe, as can be seen also
 4 in Risør's and several other chapters of this volume.

5 Nevertheless, from a comparative anthropological perspective, building
 6 liberal premises into the very concept of security, as securitization theo-
 7 rists (and anthropologists who follow Durkheim and Radcliffe-Brown in
 8 thinking of security as a matter of social reproduction) do, forecloses a host
 9 of alternative concerns with security in different settings. In fact, consider-
 10 ing the concerted critique that modern liberal distinctions such as society/
 11 individual, state/citizen, sovereign/subject have been receiving within anthro-
 12 pology for decades now, it would be naïve to pin one's conceptual flag of
 13 security on any unproblematised idea of social reproduction, as if there were
 14 such a thing as 'the social' in the first place, which could be kept 'the same'
 15 (re-produced) through time. Accordingly, if, inspired by both classical British
 16 social anthropology and securitization theory, we wish to define security as
 17 the reproduction of a given social collective over time, we must immediately
 18 ask, to what order and form of collectivity does the epithet 'social' refer in a
 19 given instance? And to what form and time of 'reproduction'?

20 A good way to start addressing these questions is by considering the
 21 most overtly nonliberal ethnographic case presented in this volume, namely
 22 Heonik Kwon's chapter on time consciousness in North Korean state security
 23 discourses. Addressing this volume's central concern with the relation-
 24 ship between security and time, the overall aim of Kwon's chapter is to
 25 characterise the different historical temporalities that have coalesced in
 26 North Korean state security discourse since the end of the Cold War. Paying
 27 close attention to a variety of discursive, and often overtly rhetorical, tropes
 28 in leaders' pronouncements, as well as in indigenous academic commentar-
 29 ies upon them, Kwon argues that North Korea's solitary state-socialist path
 30 is caught up in the historicities of a profoundly postcolonial political heri-
 31 tage. For example, the heroic imagery of the so-called Arduous March of a
 32 small group of partisans led by the country's founding leader in 1938 when
 33 escaping colonial persecution at the hands of the Japanese in Manchuria is
 34 transposed onto the description of North Koreans' more recent sufferings
 35 after the end of the Cold War, and particularly the national experience of
 36 famine since 1994, which is also referred to as an Arduous March. Crucial
 37 to Kwon's analysis is the idea is that such transpositions across different
 38 temporal scales of North Korean history rely on what Kwon calls a "philos-
 39 ophical doctrine" about how the mutual articulation of leader, society, and
 40 individual is to be conceived in the context of what state discourse brands
 41 as a 'partisan state'. This is the doctrine of the 'barrel-of-a-gun', (*ch'ongdae*)
 42 which, as Kwon explains, posits a "moral and practical unity between the
 43 army and the society, which involves reforming the society in the model of
 44 a military organisation, as well as, if necessary, subordinating the society's
 45 needs to the needs of the army institution" (Kwon, this volume). Effacing
 46

the very distinction between army and people, this wholesale militarization of the North Korean populace constitutes, one might say, the ontological condition of possibility for the discursive assimilation of an entire national population, in all of its social complexity, in the role of partisan cadres of anticolonial struggle. 1

In North Korean political discourse, then, security is *anything but* a matter of regulating the relationship between ontologically distinct realms of state sovereignty and of civil society, let alone of personal freedom. Rather, security is set up explicitly as a function of the *collapse* of that very distinction into the more encompassing assimilation of the whole people into the military apparatus of the state, glued together, as Kwon explains, by an abiding imperative towards love for the Leader (see also Holbraad, in press). Indeed, given the explicitly ‘partisan’ and anticapitalist nature of this concerted ontopolitical operation in North Korean state discourse, it is revealing to note that a cognate fusion is also effected in a very different (but arguably in some ways similarly partisan) setting—namely, among the left-radical protesters whose clashes with the Danish police during the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference of 2009 (COP 15) are the subject of Stine Krøijer’s chapter. In teasing out the contrasting notions of time and future involved, on the one hand, in the security measures adopted by the police during the protest, and, on the other, in the tactics enacted by the protesters themselves, Krøijer emphasises the ways in which the clashes between these two groups turn on a fundamental ontological divergence. 2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

From the perspective of the police, as Krøijer explains, the security threat posed by these protests was conceptualised as ultimately a matter of individual troublemakers subverting the right to protest towards violent ends. Bolstered by an evolving body of Europe-wide security legislation and enforcement practices, the Danish police saw their job essentially as that of extending into the future the rule of law as sanctioned by the authorities. Above all, this involved first identifying and then neutralizing particular individuals whom the police deemed as threats. In this way, Krøijer shows, the police’s understanding of the situation essentially accords with the liberal cosmology of politics we have identified in relation also to the Copenhagen School model of securitization: the police’s job is taken as that of mediating the relationship between sovereign political bodies and individual subjects who may threaten them. 24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

Confronted by this logic, however, the protesters seek deliberately to *erode* the foundational liberal distinction between collective state structures and individual agents that may or may not conform to them. As Krøijer shows with reference to her ethnography of what the protesters call their *own* ‘security culture’ (*sikkerhedskultur*), referring to the protective measures they take against the police, the abiding objective of the protesters is to develop manners of action that allow forms of *collective* agency to emerge, such that they may form “one big body acting together”, as one activist put it. Not entirely unlike the North Korean image of the people 37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

1 as a barrel-of-a-gun, this collective body is most operatively forged during
 2 protest itself, in the tussle with police, during which the protesters' onto-
 3 logical fusion generates a powerful sense of control in the face of concerted
 4 police violence. Hence, confronting the state-sanctioned image of security
 5 as a state of order projected into the future, the protesters enact an opposi-
 6 tional experience of security in the powerful, albeit necessarily temporary
 7 and ultimately fleeting, experience of literally *becoming* a collective.

8 This and other comparable ethnographic analyses from different state
 9 socialist and/or revolutionary populist contexts (see also Risør, this vol-
 10 ume; Holbraad and Pedersen 2012; Holbraad, in press) demonstrate the
 11 basic contingency of the notion that securitization must involve a passage
 12 between realms of 'ordinary' and 'extraordinary' politics—this being the
 13 premise not only of the Copenhagen School model, but also of other recent
 14 revivals of Schmitt's (2005) and Agamben's (2005) work on 'states of
 15 exception' and emergency, which hark directly back to the founding liberal
 16 distinction between sovereigns and subjects. Indeed, this observation can
 17 easily be extended also to anthropology's own more or less explicit concern
 18 with security since Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown, as discussed earlier.
 19 In fact, the question of social reproduction itself very much entails the lib-
 20 eral ontology we have just outlined. After all, the Durkheimian question—
 21 how transcendent social forms are maintained in the face of the transience
 22 of the lives of the individuals who man them—can basically be conceived as
 23 a sociologically inflected version of the old Hobbesian question about the
 24 legitimacy and the necessity of sovereign bodies: society is to individual as
 25 state is to subject.

26 It follows that our working definition of security as a matter of the repro-
 27 duction and survival of 'social collectives over time', as offered earlier, can
 28 play only a strictly *heuristic* role as an aid to cross-cultural anthropological
 29 comparison. Certainly, reference to 'social collectivities' should be divested
 30 of the heavy *analytical* freight that notions of 'society' tend to carry—for
 31 example, understood in quasi-metaphysical terms, and in opposition to an
 32 equally loaded notion of 'the individual' (Dumont 1992). In particular, the
 33 deliberately loose notion of 'social collectivities' should not be understood as
 34 just a synonym for, say, 'social groups' or, much less, 'state orders'. Rather,
 35 in an attempt to bypass the liberal cosmological assumptions embedded in
 36 this language, we talk of collectivities in order to refer to any phenomenon
 37 in human lives that takes on a distinct social *form*, and whose survival
 38 and reproduction as such are at stake. Such a heuristic and open-ended
 39 understanding of security as a matter of the perdurance of social forms
 40 has the effect of multiplying the ways in which security can be construed
 41 as being at issue in any given ethnographic context. Indeed, central to this
 42 volume's agenda is precisely the idea that what security might be and how
 43 it might articulate with varying sociocultural logics in different settings are
 44 very much open ethnographic questions. The volume's net effect, in other
 45 words, is to use ethnographic variability effectively to multiply what we
 46

might call ‘ontologies of security’, not just to show up the parochialism of liberal assumptions about what security might be, but also to explore alternatives to liberalism as *sui generis* lived realities.

TIMES OF SECURITY

We are now better conceptually equipped to add some substance to our claim to be offering a comparative ethnography of securitization in the contemporary world. As has become apparent in the foregoing discussion, behind our general ethnographic plea to pluralize, if you like, the forms of security—its ‘whats’ as well as its ‘wherefores’—lies also a more focused concern with the variable ‘whens’ of security: its multiple *times*, as per the volume’s title. Indeed, one might ask in this connection: if binding security to the liberal distinction between society and individual posits it as a peculiarly progress-oriented concern (see ahead), then what temporal logics are associated with other concepts of security found in different ethnographic contexts across the world? While we find cogent Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde’s observation that all security discourses “are about the future, about alternative futures—always hypothetical—and about counterfactuals” (1998, 32), we appeal to the ethnographic variability of the chapters of this volume to ask, what future? How alternative? Counterfactual to what present, if any, and what past? Indeed, going further, couldn’t *change itself*, in certain contexts, be conceived as that which must be secured? Is that not what we mean, for example, when we speak of the need to render secure a ‘living democracy’—the possibility for particular forms of change being an immanent feature of democratic societal order?

Such a move to multiply the times of security is a direct corollary of our critique of the more or less implicit liberal underpinnings of much political anthropology and its abiding, albeit tacit, concerns with security. If the problem of social reproduction, understood as a function of the liberal distinction between society and individual, is too restricted to provide a cross-cultural gloss on questions of security, then so too is the notion of time, which anthropologists have typically taken for granted in formulating the problem in the first place—namely the linear chronology of history as the dimension in which individual reproduction (needs-fulfilment) must unfold (see also Hirsch and Stewart 2005; Stewart 2012). As shown by political theorists (Burke 2002) and economic historians (Rothschild 1995), liberalism gave birth to a new temporal ontology, which infuses the liberal political and philosophical project to this day—namely, the concept of linear societal progression. As Burke puts it, “the future was now a thinkable space in political discourse, and a general progressive movement could be imagined as an essential condition of human society” (2002, 12). In liberal society, we could say then, the role of security is to protect man’s ability to expect (and thus plan) what happens next: “expectation is a chain that

1 unites our present and our future existence, and passes beyond ourselves to
 2 generations which follow us” (Bentham, cited in Burke 2002, 12).

3 In that sense, liberal political cosmology may be said to operate with a
 4 particular concept (or temporal ontology) of what it means for something
 5 to exist and how this mode of existence may be secured from threat. This
 6 is a significant limitation, we believe, for there is bound to be many more
 7 than one mode of existence (and thus more than one temporality of danger)
 8 in the world—and anthropologists would seem to be in a particularly good
 9 position to explore the characteristics of such alternative times of security.

10 Anja Kublitz’s contribution to this volume provides a prime example.
 11 The chapter focuses on the notion of *Nakba* (translated as ‘the Catastrophe’),
 12 which her Palestinian informants in Denmark use to describe the
 13 expulsion of Palestinians from their homeland in 1948. This emblematic
 14 event, argues Kublitz, can feasibly be treated as a “reverse national myth”:
 15 while nations habitually ground their existence in a founding moment, Pal-
 16 estinians across the world refer their status as a landless people back to the
 17 moment of origin of their expulsion from their land in Palestine and their
 18 subsequent dispersal across the globe. This basic reversal, as Kublitz shows,
 19 lies at the heart of a paradox: if this reverse origin myth is essentially one of
 20 loss, then why have Palestinians continually returned to it, seizing the term
 21 *Nakba* again and again to describe all manner of political disappointment
 22 that their cause has confronted in the sixty years of their (largely futile)
 23 struggle to have a Palestinian state recognised? Why invoke and relive the
 24 pain of the *Nakba* at every turn of their struggle? To answer this ques-
 25 tion, Kublitz develops a sophisticated argument regarding the particular
 26 temporality that *Nakba* enacts. Far from merely assimilating the present to
 27 the ‘absolute past’ of myth as a Lévi-Straussian analysis might have it, she
 28 argues, the ever-returning character of the *Nakba* is best understood in a
 29 Deleuzian sense, as a ‘repetition with a difference’. With reference to her
 30 detailed description of a commemoration of the *Nakba* held by Palestin-
 31 ian immigrants in Denmark in 2008, as well as her ethnographic account
 32 of young second-generation immigrants’ violent reaction to police security
 33 measures in Copenhagen since then (oppressive measures that were also
 34 referred back to *Nakba* by her informants), Kublitz argues that her infor-
 35 mants’ insistence on the notion of *Nakba* is essentially a way of keeping its
 36 outcome open as a potential. Rendering *Nakba*’s temporality nonlinear and
 37 ever-emergent (i.e., *Nakba* is not an event of the past, but rather a condition
 38 that repeats itself over and again in the on-going struggle for a Palestinian
 39 state) allows Kublitz’s informants to gain control over its emergent unfold-
 40 ing, and thus, potentially, to reverse it. Indeed *reversal* of the ‘reverse’ origin
 41 of *Nakba* is what is most at stake in her informants’ deliberate repetitions
 42 of the catastrophe. As Kublitz shows, both the commemorative events of
 43 2008 and the conflict in which second-generation immigrants engaged the
 44 Danish police since then can be understood as meticulous attempts,
 45 symbolically and in practice, to reverse the experience of loss, effectively
 46

enacting, in the present, <i>Nakba</i> as what one might conceive as the gain of a double negative: <i>Nakba</i> as the reverse of the reversal.	1
	2
One might express the originality of Kublitz's approach in relation to the by now somewhat hackneyed anthropological call to 'process-oriented' analysis. Thus, despite the ubiquity of praxiological concepts in anthropological scholarship, it is seldom asked what, precisely, is meant by 'social process', 'political event', and 'cultural flux', let alone what overarching temporal ontology is underwriting such concepts and models of social change. ⁴ Indeed, this is a key ethnographic message of Kublitz's paper: that it must always remain an empirical question what 'change', 'process', and indeed 'time' are, and does, in any given setting.	3
	4
	5
	6
	7
	8
	9
	10
	11
Like Kublitz's chapter, Richard Kernaghan's chapter on coca-leaf divination and local forms of premonition among cocaine smugglers in the Andes is concerned with people's capacity to interfere with the very constitution of time to generate alternatively 'secure' futures. Adducing a series of often deeply poetic stories of how professional diviners and curers, as well as the singing of birds and other omens, help drug smugglers along their way in their illicit journeys across the Andean landscape, Kernaghan's chapter elaborates a complex theorisation of how such practices generate temporalities that pit themselves against those of the state and its legal and security apparatus. The entire legal infrastructure for the prohibition and persecution of drugs, Kernaghan shows, serves to generate what he calls a 'state time', which radically reduces peoples' scope for action, and introduces what Kernaghan calls "a tremendous quotient of fate" (this volume). Cocaine smugglers' use of divination, magic, and forms of premonition, before, during, and after their perilous journeys across the Andes, then, is an attempt to carve out alternative temporalities of security, instantiating a variety of ways effectively to open up the temporal horizons that "ill-starred state-time" (Kernaghan, this volume) so concertedly serves to close down. Key to this time-work that coca leaves are able to perform is their dual temporal character as both the raw material for cocaine as an emblem of what Kernaghan calls "narco-modernity" and the technology for divinatory techniques that hark back to the sacred times of Andean divinities of 'tradition.' Transgressively, then, coca leaves meld together two epochal blocks that state-time seeks to keep apart—namely the preterit of a precolonial past and the present-future orientation of modernity that the state itself instantiates—the "future-perfect zone," as Kernaghan calls it. By rendering immanent the precolonial time of the sacred, divination and magic effectively usurp the temporal monopoly of state-time, opening up spaces for alternative interpretations of what may have happened and (therefore) <i>could</i> happen. It is these clandestine alternatives, which work beside or even behind the time of state security, that drug smugglers are able to inhabit. And it is by inhabiting these times that drug smugglers effectively secure themselves from the ill fate that the state, with its regimes of persecution, is bent on visiting upon them.	12
	13
	14
	15
	16
	17
	18
	19
	20
	21
	22
	23
	24
	25
	26
	27
	28
	29
	30
	31
	32
	33
	34
	35
	36
	37
	38
	39
	40
	41
	42
	43
	44
	45
	46

1 Alongside other ethnographic cases explored in this volume, what Ker-
2 naghan's account makes abundantly clear is that there are different ways of
3 being under threat, not just because (in)security means different things to
4 different people, but also because the nature of 'existence' and 'time' itself
5 varies so markedly in different settings. Indeed, if different social collec-
6 tives may be said to exist in different ways and operate within and across
7 different temporal logics, then there must also be different ways in which
8 their existence can be perceived to come under threat. Accordingly, we can-
9 not assume beforehand which *form of being* is in danger (is 'existentially
10 threatened' in the security studies jargon) in a given ethnographic case, for
11 different modes of social existence—and different ways of being political
12 also—are imbued with different temporalities and thus different criteria for
13 what ensures their durability over time.

14 Such concerns are not borne merely of the more or less forgotten, or more
15 or less ignored, fringes of modern neoliberal states, such as the plights of
16 dispossessed Palestinian refugees or the divinatory practices of marginalized
17 Andean coca smugglers. The idea that security, and politics more generally,
18 is folded into a multitude of overlapping temporalities extends right into the
19 engine rooms of modern state powers and their technologies of security. We
20 have already discussed how, according to Kwon's chapter in this volume,
21 North Korean security discourses are bound up within certain postcolonial
22 narratives that delineate temporal vectors that translate into what easily looks
23 like a paranoid national politics. A strikingly similar case of a deeply securi-
24 tized political imagination founded on post-Cold War paranoia can be found
25 in Maja Petrović-Šteger's contribution. Comparing the role of what she calls
26 "neurosecurity" in Serbia during and after the wars of the 1990s and in the
27 training discourses of the US military, Petrović-Šteger's chapter shows how
28 national/military concerns with "threats to national consciousness" gain hold
29 in different historical and political junctures. Offering vivid insight into some
30 of the most esoteric aspects of security discourse in Serbia during the wars of
31 the 1990s, Petrović-Šteger shows in detail how the experience of these con-
32 flicts was characterised by abiding concerns with the "psychological warfare"
33 of the NATO forces and other enemies, which included elaborate discourses
34 about the techniques of "neocortical war" and "astral attacks" waged from
35 "global dark centres." Framing a national military-political imaginary in
36 these terms, key Serbian military personnel would even go as far as claiming
37 that enemy aircraft and rockets were being destroyed using "the power of the
38 mind", based on the operation of the so-called Tesla's weapon, named after a
39 famous Serbian engineer.

40 Exotic as it may seem, this heady mix of science with psychic mysti-
41 cism is not vastly dissimilar, argues Petrović-Šteger, to the US military's
42 on-going efforts to harness for military purposes the neural functions of
43 combatants' brains. Conducted under the banner of military-funded "con-
44 sciousness studies", such efforts at "optimising" experimentally the cogni-
45 tive performance of US military personnel draw on a longer tradition of
46 parapsychological research within the US military establishment. Building

on Carol Greenhouse's point that notions of time may constitute "symbolic and hermeneutic reservoirs for the legitimisation of social institutions",	1
Petrović-Šteger argues that in both Serbia and the United States, psychic security discourses are founded in "paratime"—that is, a temporal dimension that perdures beyond the ebbs and flows of historical duration. As a time-outside-time, in this sense, paratime is able to found ethical imperatives on an absolute basis and on a national scale.	2
	3
	4
	5
	6
	7
The difference between the Serbian and the American cases, then, lies in the particular temporal qualities that paratime comes to acquire in each case.	8
	9
For the American military, neurosecurity is justified by appeal to the temporal horizon of a just <i>future</i> , in which US military personnel are cognitively 'optimised' in order to better strive for the causes American foreign policy sets forth for them. Conversely, in the Serbian case the core paratemporal horizon is a sacralised heritage of the <i>past</i> , focused above all on the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, as well as the heroism of Serbian partisans in the Second World War. Not unlike <i>Nakba</i> for Kublitz's informants or the pre-Colombian heritage of the Andean drug smugglers of Kernaghan's chapter, these temporal reference points, whether future or past, effectively provide the templates for people's imaginings of what a time of security might look like.	10
	11
	12
	13
	14
	15
	16
	17
	18
	19
Post-Cold War political paranoia and the associated instruments and tools of securitization are also central in Joseph Masco's chapter. Scaling up the object of existential threat to embrace not just the nation-state but the entire planet, Masco explores the multigenerational imbrications of nuclear weapons and climate change in the United States. His central contention is that the Cold War nuclear project enabled a new vision of the planet as an integrated biosphere, and that the security state's continual reliance on nuclear weapons to constitute its superpower status today blocks action on nonmilitarized planetary threats, such as climate change. By singling out three moments in which nuclear crisis and ecological crisis were brought into mutual focus (in 1953, 1983, 2003), he uncovers the acts of political translation that enabled diverse forms of risk to be configured as a singular national security problem in the United States. Through this "alternative genealogy of the nuclear age", Masco shows how the Cold War nuclear arms race produced an unprecedented commitment to research in the earth sciences, enabling a new vision of the globe as integrated political, technological, and environmental space, and, therefore, new fears of planetary threat. Making nuclear fear the core instrument of state power allowed the arms race to establish a nationalized vision of planetary danger, which installed a specific set of ideas about catastrophic risk in the United States that has been deployed by the state security apparatus to enable different geopolitical projects ever since.	20
	21
	22
	23
	24
	25
	26
	27
	28
	29
	30
	31
	32
	33
	34
	35
	36
	37
	38
	39
	40
	41
Well into the early twenty-first century, then, the mutual embroilments of nuclear weapons and planetary threat remain so profound that they allow the global security implications of a warming planet to elude the US 'War on Terror'. Attending to the ecological coordinates of the nuclear revolution in that sense does not just challenge contemporary American ideas about	42
	43
	44
	45
	46

1 planetary risk; it also reveals the conceptual and practical limits of a strictly
 2 national form of security. In this way, as Masco convincingly demonstrates,
 3 attending to the shrinking arctic ice caps or the new weather patterns is to
 4 reject the old and bounded idea of a national security and replace it with a
 5 new, broader planetary vision of global sustainability. In this sense, Masco's
 6 chapter addresses the question of times of security in two overlapping ways.
 7 On the one hand, Masco describes a number of epochs in newer US political
 8 history, which may each be characterised as a distinct "time of security"
 9 (e.g., the 'War on Terror'). On the other, Masco's argument about the subtle
 10 manner in which the types of dangers posed by climate change and nuclear
 11 weapons have continually been transposed, rather than simply misrecognised,
 12 by national security narratives shows how the concept of security is itself ame-
 13 nable to perpetual historical change and temporal transformation.

16 CONCLUSION

17
 18 To close, we may return to the broader question of why an anthropology of
 19 security is needed and to what ends—analytical and political—this emerg-
 20 ing field of study might be put to use. To study times of security, after all, is
 21 not just to explore social life during a particular period of perceived threat.
 22 Rather, as we saw in relation to the foundational anthropological debate
 23 about individual uncertainty and social reproduction, it is to institute secu-
 24 rity as an analytical concern that is as basic to the study of social life as
 25 any ever was. This is particularly so, as we have sought to demonstrate,
 26 because, construed in this way, the anthropological study of security per-
 27 tains to the very conditions of possibility of human existence across differ-
 28 ent scales of social living, as it is played out in and as the unfolding of time.
 29 Indeed, one of the reasons for which we find the theme of security a promis-
 30 ing point of departure for a comparative political ethnography of the sort
 31 that is presented in this volume is that, viewed as a distinctly anthropologi-
 32 cal concept, 'security' is less theoretically tainted than other terms that are
 33 available in the theoretical arsenal of modern political anthropology, such
 34 as, say, 'governmentality', 'resistance', or 'sovereignty'.

35 Yet, as noted earlier, the concept of security is obviously tainted *politi-*
 36 *cally*. Not only is 'security', in many ways, a sign of the times in which
 37 we live (climate change, war on terror, global financial crisis . . . but then
 38 again, could not any historical epoch or 'global age' be cast as a 'time of
 39 security?'), but it is also, as we have seen, a tool by which states and other
 40 sovereign bodies exercise power and control over their subjects, and devise
 41 and implement new ways of legitimising and strengthening this authori-
 42 ty. Somewhat paradoxically, we would suggest, it is precisely its explicitly
 43 politicised nature that renders 'security' such a compelling object of study
 44 for an anthropology bent on forging new concepts through creative engage-
 45 ment with ethnographic material, in order to arrive at new critical vantages
 46

on established discourses and the public debates that they support (see also Henare, Holbraad, and Wastell 2007; Holbraad and Pedersen 2009; Pedersen 2011; Pedersen 2012b; Holbraad 2012). Ideally, by connecting and comparing multifarious local discourses and practices of security across a selected constellation of ethnographic settings, it should be possible ethnographically to extend, push, and 'distort' conventional meanings of security and cognate concepts among policy makers and political scientists (including political anthropologists). In so doing, anthropology can pave the way for novel, at once deepened and sharpened, understandings of what security (and, more broadly, politics) could be, from a cross-cultural perspective.

The question of time, we suggest, lies at the heart of such an attempt to use the power of ethnography as the contingent vantage point from which concepts of security may be effectively reinvented. As we have demonstrated through our critical discussion of the liberal underpinnings of much political theory and contemporary social science, it is near-impossible to think of security without also imagining particular forms of reproduction, projection, and transformation of various units of social life, including human subjects. As the chapters in this volume show, to take security seriously as an object of anthropological analysis is also to take time more seriously in a distinctly anthropological way, for the two concepts are folded into one another in complex ways, which can be disentangled and understood only through careful ethnographic exegesis. This, we suggest, is what may distinguish security from other apparently more foundational anthropological categories such as 'society', 'culture', and 'cosmology'. While such analytical concepts are also infused with multiple temporal tropes, they tend to be so in ways that are both more implicit and less sophisticated than security and its many times, as we showed in our discussion of classic British social anthropology as well as more recent political anthropology. After all, we have argued, security is a political concept and activity that makes time come about in certain ways. It does so by delineating and instantiating particular formations and deformations of the social, which, as we see in the chapters of this volume, may or may not correspond to the prevailing binaries of liberal political cosmology, including its core myth of society versus individual. More encompassing and more fundamental than such putative axioms, then, the notion of security offers itself up as a fecund terrain for ethnographic-cum-theoretical innovation in its own right.

NOTES

1. Our gloss of the story of anthropology from the point of view of security could continue beyond these divergences between Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown. For example, one could conceive of structuralism, in the work of Claude Lévi-Strauss (1966) and Mary Douglas (2002), as an argument about categorisation as a form of cognitive security, purging disorder and danger through schemes of symbolic purification. The same could be said of, say, E. E. Evans-Pritchard's (1956) or Clifford Geertz's (1973)

1 interpretative hermeneutics, which present religious ideas as orders of symbolic
2 meaning by which humans make sense of the putative uncertainties of
3 existence.

- 4 2. Mindful, obviously, of the contested character of the term, we use the
5 adjective 'liberal' in a conceptually minimal sense, to refer to the idea
6 that political processes operate upon (the question of sovereignty) and
7 are sustained by (the question of legitimacy) people who in an irreducible
8 sense remain transcendent to them. Indeed, at issue here is not liberalism
9 conceived as a particular political arrangement, ideology, or system of
10 government, but rather a basic premise that underlies such political for-
11 mations. Thus security may be seen as liberal society's capacity to sustain
12 a sense of proportion between freedom and control: it invests each citizen
13 with the possibility and the duty to 'add up' into the state, and the state
14 with the capacity and the obligation to apportion itself into manageable
15 parcels of government, along a continuous thrust of development (Roth-
16 schild 1995; Goldstein 2010, 490). As demonstrated by Nikolas Rose
17 (1995) among others, this proportional logic has been carried into late
18 modern forms of neoliberal governance, in which "the state relies on indi-
19 vidualizing techniques of governmentality to free itself from the various
20 responsibilities of maintaining its subjects, conferring upon those subjects
21 themselves the daily obligations of self-maintenance and self-regulation"
22 (Goldstein 2010, 492).
- 23 3. As Anthony Burke points out, it was Hobbes and Locke who "established
24 security as a key signifier in the myth of . . . the modern state form"
25 (2002, 9), which, in this ur-liberal myth, emerged "from the state of
26 nature through the exchange of freedom for security" (ibid., 10). This is
27 why, as Burke goes on to explain, security "function[s] as the threshold
28 and fulcrum of our modernity", for, as Foucault has demonstrated, in
29 spite or perhaps because of the fact that the two are bifurcated in mod-
30 ern liberal society, one can no longer speak of "a 'synthetic', vulnerable
31 link between sovereign and subject but their absolute fusion and identity"
32 (ibid., 10).
- 33 4. Indeed, as has been pointed out by Mark Hodges among others (2008; see
34 also Nielsen 2011 and Pedersen 2012a), the question as to whether 'pro-
35 cess' or 'praxis' anthropology has actually fulfilled its promises remains
36 moot, not least because it would seem that these approaches contain
37 their own assumptions about the essential nature of 'change' and 'pro-
38 cess' themselves. As Hodges puts it, there is thus a clear sense to which a
39 "tacit unspecified temporal ontology" is being evoked through present-
40 day anthropology's "common root vocabulary of process, flow or flux . . .
41 implying in an unspecified way the notion that time involves 'change'"
42 (2008, 402).

38 REFERENCES

- 40 Agamben, Giorgio. 2005. *State of Exception*. Translated by Kevin Attell. Chicago:
41 University of Chicago Press.
- 42 Albro, Robert, George Marcus, Laura A. McNamara, and Monica Schoch-Spana,
43 eds. 2011. *Anthropologists in the SecurityScape: Ethics, Practice and Profes-
44 sional Identity*. Walnut Creek: Left Coast.
- 45 Beck, Ulrich. 1992. *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*. London: SAGE.

- Biehl, João. 2005. *Vita: Life in a Zone of Social Abandonment*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1
- Bubandt, Nils. 2005. "Vernacular Security: The Politics of Feeling Safe in Global, National and Local Worlds." *Security Dialogue* 36 (3): 275–296. 2
- Burke, Anthony. 2002. "Aporias of Security." *Alternatives* 27: 1–27. 3
- Buur, Lars, Steffen Jensen, and Finn Stepputat, eds. 2007. *The Security-Development Nexus: Expressions of Sovereignty in Southern India*. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. 4
- Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. 1998. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 5
- Comaroff, Jean, and John Comaroff, J. 1999. "Occult Economies and the Violence of Abstraction: Notes from the South African Postcolony." *American Ethnologist* 26 (3): 279–301. 6
- Das, Veena. 2006. *Life and Words: Violence and the Descent into the Ordinary*. Berkeley: California University Press. 7
- Douglas, Mary. 2002. *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concept of Pollution and Taboo*. London: Routledge. 8
- Duffield, Mark. 2007. *Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples*. London: Polity. 9
- . 2010. *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security*. London: Zed Books. 10
- Dumont, Louis. 1992. *Essays on Individualism: Modern Ideology in Anthropological Perspective*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 11
- Eriksen, Thomas H. 2010. "Human Security and Social Anthropology." In *A World of Insecurity: Anthropological Perspectives on Human Security*, edited by Thomas H. Eriksen, Ellen Bal, and O. Salemink, 1–19. London: Pluto. 12
- Eriksen, Thomas H., Ellen Bal, and Oscar Salemink, eds. 2010. *A World of Insecurity: Anthropological Perspectives on Human Security*. London: Pluto. 13
- Evans-Pritchard, E. E. 1956. *Nuer Religion*. Oxford: Clarendon. 14
- Feldman, Alan. 1991. *Formations of Violence: The Narrative of the Body and Political Terror in Northern Ireland*. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 15
- Feldmann, Ilana. 2008. *Governing Gaza: Bureaucracy, Authority, and the Work of Rule, 1917–1967*. Durham: Duke University Press. 16
- Geertz, Clifford. 1973. *The Interpretation of Cultures*. New York: Basic Books. 17
- Gledhill, John. 2008. "Anthropology in the Age of Securitization." Annual Joel S. Kahn Lecture, La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia, December 5. Accessed May 15, 2012. <http://jg.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/Conferences/Anthropology%20in%20the%20Age%20of%20Securitization.pdf>. 18
- Goldstein, Daniel M. 2010. "Toward a Critical Anthropology of Security." *Current Anthropology* 51 (4): 487–517. 19
- Green, Linda. 1995. "Living in a State of Fear." In *Fieldwork under Fire: Contemporary Studies of Violence and Survival*, edited by C. Nordstrom and A. Robben, 105–127. Berkeley: University of California Press. 20
- Gusterson, Hugh. 1996. *Nuclear Rites: A Weapons Laboratory at the End of the Cold War*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 21
- . 2004. *People of the Bomb: Portraits of America's Nuclear Complex*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 22
- Gusterson, Hugh, and Catherine Besteman, eds. 2009. *The Insecure American: How We Got Here and What We Should Do about It*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 23
- Guyer, Jane. 2007. "Prophecy and the Near Future: Thoughts on Macro-economic, Evangelical, and Punctuated Time." *American Ethnologist* 34 (3): 409–450. 24

- 1 Hamilton, Jennifer A., and Aimee J. Placas. 2011. "Anthropology Becoming . . . ?
2 The 2010 Sociocultural Anthropology Year in Review." *American Anthropologist* 113 (2): 246–261.
- 3 Henare, Amira, Martin Holbraad, and Sari Wastell. 2007. "Introduction:
4 Thinking through Things." In *Thinking through Things: Theorizing Artefacts Ethnographically*, edited by A. Henare, M. Holbraad, and S. Wastell,
5 1–31. London: Routledge.
- 6 Hirsch, Eric, and Charles Stewart. 2005. "Introduction: Ethnographies of Histori-
7 city." *Anthropology and History* 16 (3): 261–274.
- 8 Hobbsbawm, Eric J. 1992. *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*. Cambridge:
9 Cambridge University Press.
- 10 Hodges, Matt. 2008. "Rethinking Time's Arrow: Bergson, Deleuze and the Anthro-
11 pology of Time." *Anthropological Theory* 8 (4): 399–429.
- 12 Holbraad, Martin. 2012. *Truth in Motion: The Recursive Anthropology of Cuban*
13 *Divination*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
- 14 ———. In press. "Revolución o muerte: Self-sacrifice and the Ontology of Cuban
15 Revolution." *Ethnos*. Unpublished manuscript.
- 16 Holbraad, Martin, and Morten Axel Pedersen. 2009. "Planet M: The Intense
17 Abstraction of Marilyn Strathern." *Anthropological Theory* 9 (4): 371–394.
- 18 ———. 2012. "Revolutionary Securitization: An Anthropological Extension of
19 Securitization Theory." *International Theory* 4 (2): 165–197.
- 20 Ingold, Tim, Marilyn Strathern, J. D. Y. Peel, Christina Toren, and Jonathan Spen-
21 cer. 1996. "The Concept of Society Is Theoretically Obsolete." In *Key Debates*
22 *in Anthropology*, edited by T. Ingold, 55–98. London: Routledge.
- 23 Jackson, Michael. 2005. *Existential Anthropology: Events, Exigencies and Effects*.
24 Oxford: Berghahn Books.
- 25 Jahn, Egbert, Pierre Lemaitre, and Ole Wæver. 1987. *European Security—Prob-*
26 *lems of Research on Non-military Aspects*. Copenhagen Papers 1. Copenhagen:
27 Centre for Peace and Conflict Research.
- 28 Jensen, Steffen. 2010. "The Security and Development Nexus in Cape Town: War
29 on Gangs, Counterinsurgency and Citizenship." *Security Dialogue* 47 (1):
30 77–98.
- 31 Kelly, Tobias. 2006. *Law, Violence, and Sovereignty among West Bank Palestin-*
32 *ians*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- 33 Kent, Alexandra. 2006. "Reconfiguring Security: Buddhism and Moral Legitimacy
34 in Cambodia." *Security Dialogue* 37 (3): 343–361.
- 35 Kleinman, Arthur. 2006. *What Really Matters: Living a Moral Life amidst Uncer-*
36 *tainty and Danger*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- 37 Kwon, Heonik, and Byung-Ho Chung. 2012. *North Korea: Beyond Charismatic*
38 *Politics*. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield.
- 39 Lévi-Strauss, Claude. 1966. *The Savage Mind*. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- 40 Lutz, Catherine. 2006. "Empire Is in the Details." *American Ethnologist* 3 (4):
41 593–611.
- 42 ———, ed. 2009. *The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle against U.S. Military*
43 *Posts*. New York: NYU Press.
- 44 Maeckelbergh, Marianne. 2009. *The Will of the Many: How the Alterglobaliza-*
45 *tion Movement Is Changing the Face of Democracy*. London: Pluto.
- 46 Malinowski, Bronislaw. (1944) 1990. *A Scientific Theory of Culture and Other*
Essays. London: Routledge.
- Masco, Joseph. 2006. *The Nuclear Borderlands: The Manhattan Project in Post-*
Cold War New Mexico. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- McNamara, Laura A., and Robert A. Rubenstein, eds. 2011. *Dangerous Liaisons:*
Anthropologists and the National Security State. Santa Fe: School for Advanced
Research.

Nielsen, Morten. 2011. "Futures Within: Reversible Time and House-Building in Maputo, Mozambique." <i>Anthropological Theory</i> 11 (4): 397–423.	1
Nordstrom, Caroline and Antonius Robben (eds). 1996. <i>Fieldwork under Fire: Contemporary Studies of Violence and Survival</i> . Berkeley: University of California Press.	2
Ochs, Juliana. 2011. <i>Security and Suspicion: An Ethnography of Everyday Life in Israel</i> . Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.	3
Pedersen, Morten Axel. 2011. <i>Not Quite Shamans: Spirit Worlds and Political Lives in Northern Mongolia</i> . Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.	4
———. 2012a. "A Day in the Cadillac: The Work of Hope in Urban Mongolia." <i>Social Analysis</i> 56 (2): 136–151	5
———. 2012b. "Common Nonsense. A review of certain recent reviews of the "ontological turn". <i>Anthropology of This Century</i> , 5.	6
Povinelli, Elizabeth. 2011. <i>Economies of Abandonment: Social Belonging and Endurance in Late Liberalism</i> . Durham: Duke University Press.	7
Radcliffe-Brown, A. R. 1952. <i>Structure and Function in Primitive Society: Essays and Addresses</i> . New York: Free Press.	8
———. 1977. "The Interpretation of Andaman Island Ceremonies." In <i>The Social Anthropology of Radcliffe-Brown</i> , edited by Adam Kuper, 71–102. London: Routledge.	9
Rose, Niklas. 1999. "Advanced Liberalism." In <i>Power of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought</i> , 137–166. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.	10
Rothschild, Emma. 1995. "What Is Security?" <i>Dædalus</i> 124 (3): 53–98.	11
Sahlins, Marshall. 1974. <i>Stone Age Economics</i> . London: Tavistock.	12
———. 1977. <i>Culture and Practical Reason</i> . Chicago: Chicago University Press.	13
Schmitt, Carl. 2005. <i>Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty</i> . Translated by G. George Schwab. Chicago: Chicago University Press.	14
Stanner, W. E. H. 2009. <i>The Dreaming and Other Essays</i> . Melbourne: Black.	15
Stewart, Charles. 2012. <i>Dreaming and Historical Consciousness in Island Greece</i> . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.	16
Stocking, George. 1991. <i>Colonial Situations: Essays on the Contextualization of Ethnographic Knowledge</i> . Milwaukee: University of Wisconsin Press.	17
Strathern, Marilyn. 2004. <i>Partial Connections</i> . Rev. ed. Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira.	18
Taussig, Michael. 1992. <i>The Nervous System</i> . London: Routledge.	19
UNDP. 1994. <i>Human Development Report 1994</i> . New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press	20
Vigh, Henrik. 2006. <i>Navigating Terrains of War: Youth and Soldiering in Guinea-Bissau</i> . Oxford: Berghahn Books.	21
Vuori, Juha A. 2008. "Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization: Applying the Theory of Securitization to the Study of Non-democratic Political Orders." <i>European Journal of International Relations</i> 14 (1): 65–99.	22
Weldes, Jutta, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson, and Raymond Duvall, eds. 1999a. <i>Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger</i> . Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.	23
———. 1999b. "Introduction: Constructing Insecurity." In <i>Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger</i> , edited by J. Weldes, M. Laffey, H. Gusterson, and R. Duvall, 1–34. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.	24

Defining Security in Late Liberalism

A Comment on Pedersen and Holbraad

Elizabeth A. Povinelli

1. 1

2
3 As is well known, in the latter part of his life, Michel Foucault (2007)
4 began thinking about security as an emergent mode of liberal governance
5 predicated on the equally emergent problematic of population. Can we
6 speak of a “society of security” in which security is a “way of making the
7 old armatures of law and discipline function”? To answer his own question
8 Foucault began by identifying the four major features of the *dispositifs*
9 of security: spaces of security, the treatment of uncertainty (aleatory), the
10 normalizations specific to security, and the correlation between the tech-
11 nique of security and population. If we are to ask, as do the editors of this
12 volume, what is meant by security, for Foucault the answer does not come
13 from a better definition of the term security, but from understanding the
14 correlation between security and population in its historical emergence.
15 In other words, Foucault’s lectures on security, territory, and population
16 focused not on security in the abstract and not on defining the word ‘secu-
17 rity’ across multiple contexts, but rather on the inexorable linkage between
18 security and population. The apparatuses of security made no sense except
19 in relation to the population. Population came to be understood as a natu-
20 ral phenomenon, accessible to agents and techniques of transformation, but
21 only if these agents and techniques understood it as a form of utilitarian
22 desire—as not *le genre humaine* but *l’espèce humaine* (ibid., 70–71). They
23 were intended to manage the population newly conceived as distinct from
24 an aggregation of individuals ordered by individual or sovereign will.

25 Insofar as security and population emerged as the charge and goal of
26 liberal governance, it displaced and conditioned the freedom of the people.
27 Indeed, Foucault would argue in his 1982 College de France lectures, *Secu-*
28 *rity, Territory, Population*, that the people became the name of those who
29 threatened the population by putting freedom above security. The people,
30 and a system of governance based on the people, become the enemy of
31 the population and a mode of governance predicated on its security. “The
32 people comprise those who conduct themselves in relation to the manage-
33 ment of the population, at the level of population, as if they were not part
34